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Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lockhart v. Nelson,' the Supreme Court faced the double jeop-
ardy issue of whether retrial is precluded where an appellate court
reversed a conviction because of trial error that left the state with
insufficient evidence for conviction. The Court held that the fifth
amemdment's double jeopardy clause 2 did not bar retrial in this sit-
uation where the totality of the evidence admitted by the trial court,
whether erroneously or not, would have been sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
3
This Note contends that the principle established in Lockhart ad-
equately serves the state's law enforcement interest by assuring the
state a fair chance to punish a defendant whose guilt is clear. Fur-
ther, this Note observes that the Lockhart principle effectively repli-
cates the balancing of the defendant's and society's interests that
exist at the trial level. In this sense, the Lockhart decision demon-
strates an appreciation of the principles that underlie most double
jeopardy jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
The Lockhart case arose from a sentence enhancement proceed-
ing against the defendant in an Arkansas state court.4 In Lockhart,
1 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
2 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Further, the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, section 1, provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court held in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969),
that the fourteenth amendment made the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause ap-
plicable to the states.
3 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 287.
4 Id. at 287-88.
1112
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
the state trial court erroneously admitted evidence against the de-
fendant,5 without which the state lacked sufficient evidence to sup-
port an enhanced sentence. 6 The federal district court held that,
under such circumstances, the double jeopardy clause barred the
state from subjecting Nelson to another enhanced sentencing hear-
ing.7 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.8 The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the district
court and the Eighth Circuit because it found that the basis for re-
versing Nelson's enhanced sentence lay in the "trial error" of erro-
neously admitting a pardoned conviction, rather than on insufficient
evidence.9
A line of cases, beginning with United States v. Ball,t0 firmly es-
tablished that the double jeopardy clause's prohibition against suc-
cessive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying
a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside,
through direct appeal or collateral attack, due to some error in the
proceedings leading to conviction. 1 The Court explained in United
States v. Tateo 12 that the principle derived from the need to ensure
the sound administration of justice.' 3 The Ball principle furthers
this aim by allowing society to punish one whose guilt is clear, even
though a procedural defect tainted an earlier conviction.14
In Burks v. United States,15 the Supreme Court carved out an ex-
ception to the general rule that the double jeopardy clause does not
bar retrial where the defendant obtained reversal because of error in
the proceedings below. 16 The Court held in Burks that the double
jeopardy clause bars retrial where reversal by an appellate court
5 Id. at 288. The state introduced evidence of a pardoned conviction at defendant
Nelson's sentence enhancement hearing. Id. See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying
text.
6 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 289 (citing Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446, 449-50 (8th
Cir. 1987)).
7 Nelson v. Lockhart, 641 F. Supp. 174, 185 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
8 Nelson, 828 F.2d at 451.
9 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290-91. The significance of this distinction is explained
infra, notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
10 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
11 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 289. The Court announced this rule first in Ball, 163 U.S. at
671-72, a case in which the Court allowed the state to reindict defendants after their
convictions had been reversed on direct appeal because of defective indictment. Id. at
674 (The Court extended the Ball principle to include convictions declared invalid on
collateral appeal.).
12 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
13 Id. at 466.
14 Id. The two chief interests that the Ball principle serves, society's and the defend-
ant's, are detailed infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
15 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
16 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290 (citing Burks, 437 U.S. at 18).
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rests on the ground that the evidence proved insufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict.' 7 The Court arrived at its decision in Burks by
declaring appellate reversal for evidentiary insufficiency functionally
equivalent to an acquittal by the trial court for insufficient
evidence. 18
An issue similar to that presented by Burks arose in Greene v.
Massey, 19 a case decided on the same day as Burks. In Greene, the
Court analyzed two opinions of the Florida Supreme Court. One
was a per curiam opinion, 20 the other a "special concurrence" writ-
ten by three of the four justices signing the per curiam opinion. 2 1
These opinions cited different reasons for reversal of the defend-
ant's conviction. The per curiam opinion cited insufficient evidence
to sustain conviction, while the "special concurrence" discussed
only trial error.22 The Greene Court noted that under a Burks analy-
sis, only a reversal for insufficient evidence implicates the double
jeopardy clause. 23 The United States Supreme Court remanded the
case to the court of appeals to clarify which opinion accurately re-
flected the decision of the Florida Supreme Court.2 4 Yet the Court
also reserved the question of the double jeopardy implications for a
holding that, without erroneously admitted evidence, the jury lacked
sufficient evidence to convict.
25
The situation present in Lockhart squarely posed the question
the Court expressly reserved in Greene: whether the doublejeopardy
clause permits retrial where an appellate court identifies as grounds
17 Burks, 437 U.S. at 18. The Court here also explicitly overruled a line of prior cases
which suggested that when a defendant moved for a new trial he waived his right to an
acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency. Id.; see, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S.
552, 560 (1950); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1960).
18 Burks, 437 U.S. at 11. The Court stated that an appellate reversal for insufficient
evidence "unmistakably meant that the District Court had erred in failing to grant a
judgment of acquittal." Id. Further, "such an appellate reversal means that the govern-
ment's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to thejury." Id. at
16 (emphasis in original). The appellate court decides in such instances that "the jury
could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty." Id.
19 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
20 Sosa v. State, 215 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1968) (per curiam).
21 Id. at 745.
22 Greene, 437 U.S. at 21, 22 (citing Sosa, 215 So. 2d at 736, 737, 745-46). The per
curiam opinion in Sosa reflected the view that the state failed to produce evidence suffi-
cient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants committed first degree
murder. Sosa, 215 So. 2d at 737 (per curiam). However, the special concurrence fo-
cused instead on certain trial errors, including the improper admission of certain hear-
say evidence, as grounds for reversing the defendants' conviction. Id. at 745-46.
23 Greene, 437 U.S. at 24 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1979)).
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burks.
24 Greene, 437 U.S. at 26 n.8.
25 Id. at 26 n.9.
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for reversal of defendant's conviction the erroneous admission of
evidence against him and draws the further conclusion that, without
such evidence, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convic-
tion.26 The Court granted certiorari in Nelson 27 to resolve this
issue.28
III. FACTS
Respondent Johnny Lee Nelson pled guilty to burglary (a class
B felony) and misdemeanor theft following the theft of forty-five
dollars from a vending machine in 1979.29 Under the Arkansas Ha-
bitual Offender Statute,30 Nelson faced an enhancement of his sen-
tence because of several prior felony convictions. 3' In order to
obtain enhancement of a convicted felon's sentence, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, at a separate sentencing hearing,
that the defendant has at least four prior felony convictions. 32
At Nelson's sentencing hearing, the prosecution introduced
into evidence the certified copies of four prior felony convictions. 33
Although defense counsel failed to object at the time, Nelson him-
self balked at the admission of a 1960 conviction of assault with in-
tent to rape because he believed it to be pardoned.3 4 Upon
Nelson's objection, the prosecutor and the trial judge tried to con-
vince him that this conviction had actually been commuted to time
26 Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1988).
27 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1987).
28 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 289.
29 Nelson v. Lockhart, 641 F. Supp. 174, 175 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
30 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(2)(b) (1977) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
501 (1987)). This statute provides that a defendant who is convicted of a class B felony
and "who has previously been convicted of ... [or] found guilty of four [4] or more
felonies," may be sentenced to an enhanced term of between 20 and 40 years. Id.
31 See infra note 33.
32 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1005 (1977) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-504
(1987)).
33 Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285, 288 (1988). The prosecution introduced evi-
dence of the following convictions: 1) a 1960 conviction for assault with intent to rape,
for which Nelson received a full pardon from Governor Faubus after serving seven
years; 2) two separate 1972 convictions for possession of stolen property; and 3) a 1974
conviction for burglary and grand larceny. Nelson's record also shows two 1960 convic-
tions-one for grand larceny and the other for robbery-which the prosecutor elected
not to introduce at the enhanced sentence proceeding. Respondent's Brief at 5 n.1,
Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988) (No. 87-1277).
34 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 288. At the enhancement hearing Nelson expressed his
belief, during cross-examination, that the conviction in question had been pardoned. Id.
The prosecutor suggested to the trial court that Nelson was confusing a pardon with a
commutation to time served. Id. The trial court found that, since Nelson himself de-
scribed a commutation to time served, Nelson must never have received a pardon. Nel-
son v. Lockhart, 641 F. Supp. 174, 183 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
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served.35 Neither the court nor the prosecutor pursued any investi-
gation of Nelson's claim. 36 A jury then sentenced Nelson to twenty
years imprisonment under the Arkansas Habitual Offender
Statute.
37
Nelson petitioned the federal district court after the state courts
upheld his conviction on direct and collateral review. 38 A subse-
quent investigation by the federal district court, ordered upon re-
spondent's writ of habeas corpus, revealed that respondent actually
received a pardon from the governor for that particular convic-
tion. 39 Following this discovery by the federal district court, the
state announced its intention to resentence the respondent as a ha-
bitual offender, relying on another prior conviction not introduced
at the initial sentencing hearing.40 However, the district court held
that evidence of the pardoned conviction proved inadmissible under
Arkansas law. 4t The court further reasoned that without such evi-
dence the jury's finding lacked sufficient evidentiary basis, so the
double jeopardy clause precluded another hearing on the issue.
42
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, adopting a
rationale similar to that of the district court.43 The United States
35 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 288.
36 Id.
37 Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 175. See supra note 30 for the pertinent part of the Arkan-
sas Habitual Offender Statute.
38 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 288-89. On direct appeal, Nelson challenged the use of the
pardoned conviction to enhance his sentence. Id. at 288 n.4. The Arkansas Court of
Appeals rejected Nelson's claim based upon the absence of any contemporaneous objec-
tion by Nelson to the use of the conviction. Id. (citing the unreported opinion of the
Arkansas Court of Appeals, Nelson v. State, No. CA, CR 83-150 (May 2, 1984), App.
13). Likewise, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied Nelson relief because Nelson's
"bare assertion" of a pardon, unaccompanied by any factual evidence, proved an insuffi-
cient ground for relief. Id. (citing the unreported opinion of the Arkansas Supreme
Court, Nelson v. State, No. CR 84-133 (Nov. 19, 1984) App. 15).
39 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 289.
40 Id. See supra note 33.
41 Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 185.
42 Id.
43 Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 1987). The district court deter-
mined that the incorrect admission of the pardoned conviction could not constitute trial
error because "[t]he question of the number of prior convictions is . . .a matter of
evidentiary proof within the Arkansas statute." Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 181. The district
court further observed that "the trial court did not intervene here. It was not called
upon to rule on the validity of the conviction." Id. The federal district court reversed
Nelson's enhanced sentence because insufficient evidence existed to support the sen-
tence. Id. at 185. The district court stated that "the failure of the prosecution to intro-
duce four valid prior convictions results in an effective acquittal on the enhancement
charge." Id.
In affirming, the Eighth Circuit declared that the state put forth insufficient evi-
dence, asserting that "the facts here show that the state failed to prove that the defend-
ant had been convicted of four felonies." Nelson, 828 F.2d at 449. The Eighth Circuit
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether "the
DoubleJeopardy Clause allows retrial when a reviewing court deter-
mines that a defendant's conviction must be reversed because evi-
dence was erroneously admitted against him, and also concludes
that without the inadmissible evidence there was insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction." 44
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court held that in cases where all the evidence admitted by
the trial court-whether erroneously or not-would have been suffi-
cient to sustain a guilty verdict, the double jeopardy clause does not
preclude retrial.45 In an opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist,
46
the Court declared the situation present in the Nelson case to be the
sort of "trial error" identified in the Burks decision.47 Thus, the
Court concluded that the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial
of the defendant.
48
Justice Rehnquist first examined the rationale for the general
rule that "the double jeopardy clause's general prohibition against
successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from re-
trying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set
aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some
error in the proceedings leading to conviction." 49 Justice Rehnquist
looked to the high price society would pay if" 'every accused [were]
also ruled out the possibility that Nelson obtained reversal because of trial error, stating,
"[T]he admission of the pardoned conviction was not trial error; the trial court did not
rule on the admissibility of the conviction that the defendant claimed was pardoned by
Governor Faubus." Id.
44 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290.
45 Id. at 287.
46 Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist
in the majority opinion.
47 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290-91. See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the dissent. For a case involving three dissenting justices, the majority
made an excessively strong claim regarding the ease of determining where Lockhart fits
under a Burks analysis. The majority asserted, "It appears to us to be beyond dispute
that this is a situation described in Burks as reversal for 'trial error'-the trial court erred
in admitting a particular piece of evidence, and without it there was insufficient evidence
to support a judgment of conviction." Id. at 290. This reasoning ignores the fact that
the federal district court responsible for reversing Nelson's conviction, along with the
Eighth Circuit, predicated their double jeopardy holdings on a finding of insufficient
evidence. Nelson, 828 F.2d at 449-50; Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 185.
48 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 291. The Court stated that "[plermitting retrial in this in-
stance is not the sort of government oppression at which the DoubleJeopardy Clause is
aimed." Id.
49 Id. at 289. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient
to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to convic-
tion.' -50 Further, Justice Rehnquist noted that such a rule also
worked to the defendant's benefit because if appellate courts real-
ized that a reversal would put the accused beyond the reach of fur-
ther prosecution, they likely would not be nearly as zealous in
protecting against procedural error in the trial courts. 5' This pre-
dicted reluctance of the appellate courts would rest on society's in-
terest in punishing the guilty. 52
Justice Rehnquist then analyzed the Court's decision in Burks,
53
which created an exception to this general rule.54 He noted that in
Burks, the Court held that when an appellate court reverses a de-
fendant's conviction on the sole ground that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to sustain the jury's verdict, the double jeopardy clause bars a
retrial on the same charge. 55 Justice Rehnquist equated an appel-
late court's reversal for insufficient evidence with an acquittal of the
accused. 56 He explained that such a reversal acts, in effect, as a find-
ing that "the trial court should have entered a judgment of
acquittal."
57
Justice Rehnquist then drew a distinction between the reversal
of Nelson's conviction and reversals based solely on evidentiary in-
sufficiency. 58 Justice Rehnquist observed that the Burks Court dis-
tinguished between the double jeopardy significance of reversal
based entirely on evidentiary insufficiency and reversal premised on
"such ordinary 'trial errors' as the 'incorrect receipt or rejection of
evidence.' 59 Thus, he concluded, reversals for trial errors imply
nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
60
The "trial error" in Nelson's case, according to Justice Rehn-
quist, lay in the court's erroneous admission of one piece of evi-
50 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290 (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466
(1964)).
51 Id.
52 Id. (citing Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466). This assumes, however, that the appellate courts
grant primacy to the societal interest in punishing the guilty over the defendant's inter-
est in finality. See infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
competing interests.
53 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1979).
54 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
55 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290 (citing Burks, 437 U.S. at 18).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. The Court first drew this distinction in Burks. See supra notes 15-18 and accom-
panying text.




dence-the pardoned conviction.6 1 Justice Rehnquist carefully
noted that with the erroneously admitted evidence of the pardoned
conviction, enough evidence existed to support the enhanced sen-
tence.62 Justice Rehnquist then contended that Burks made clear
that reviewing courts "must consider all of the evidence admitted by
the trial court in deciding whether retrial is permissible under the
DoubleJeopardy Clause." 63 AsJustice Rehnquist detailed, most ap-
pellate courts subscribe to this reading of Burks.64 Thus, the trial
court's error in Nelson's sentencing hearing qualified as the "trial
error" that, under the Burks decision, permitted retrial.
65
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sented from the majority's holding, arguing that this case involved a
reversal for insufficient evidence, rather than trial error.66 Justice
Marshall argued that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evi-
dence of guilt in this case because, in relying on a pardoned convic-
tion, the prosecution's evidence at the sentencing trial "was at all
times insufficient to prove four valid convictions." 67
Justice Marshall first looked to the effect of a pardoned convic-
tion on a sentencing hearing under Arkansas' law of pardons. 68
Marshall observed that "Arkansas decisional law holds that
pardoned convictions have no probative value in sentence enhance-
ment proceedings. ' 69 Thus, argued Justice Marshall, in relying on
the pardoned conviction while opting not to introduce evidence of
61 Id.
62 Id. at 290-91.
63 Id. at 291 (citing Burks, 437 U.S. at 16-17). Indeed,Justice Rehnquist asserted that
Burks clearly enunciated this requirement, stating, "It is quite clear from our opinion in
Burks that a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court
in deciding whether retrial is permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause-indeed,
that was the ratio decidendi ofBurks." Id. Yet, the Court's opinion in Burks fails to support
this claim, at least in degree. Regarding the quantum of evidence to be examined by the
appellate court, the only reference within Burks seems only slightly suggestive. The
Court stated in Burks: "Obviously a federal appellate court.., must sustain the verdict if
there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to
uphold the jury's decision." 437 U.S. at 17. This remark hardly specifies the quantum
of evidence that must be examined to determine whether the evidence qualifies as
substantial.
64 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 291 n.8.
65 Id. at 290-91.
66 Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See supra note 33 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the four convictions.
68 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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other convictions, the state failed in its proof 70 Justice Marshall
caustically stated: "That Arkansas was not roused to investigate Nel-
son's pardon claim until long after his trial does not transform the
State's failure of proof-fatal for double jeopardy purposes under
Burks-into a mere failure of admissibility. ' 7 1 Justice Marshall con-
cluded that the state failed to prove its case after it had the "one fair
opportunity" to offer what proof it could that Nelson had four prior
convictions, and the double jeopardy clause prohibits the state any
other opportunities.
72
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's holding that
a reviewing court must look to all admitted evidence in evaluating
insufficiency for double jeopardy purposes. 73 Justice Marshall
strongly disputed the majority's assertion that Burks decided this is-
sue.74 Though Justice Marshall's dissent did not offer a rule for de-
termining what evidence a reviewing court should look to for its
sufficiency finding under a double jeopardy analysis, he located the
interests that must be balanced under such an analysis. 75 Justice
Marshall contended that "the defendant's interest in repose and so-
ciety's interest in the orderly administration of justice" act as com-
peting interests that require balancing before deciding when to
apply a double jeopardy bar.76 Thus, Justice Marshall concluded
70 Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This argument, however, offers scant gui-
dance to the appellate courts regarding their review of the evidence admitted at the trial
level. Of course, Justice Marshall refused to acknowledge that issue as the real issue of
the case: "The majority rushes headlong past those facets of Nelson's case and of Ar-
kansas law that reveal the prosecution's failure to present sufficient evidence of guilt in
this case, in order to answer the open and narrow question of Double Jeopardy law on
which the Court granted certiorari." Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also asserted that, "[s]ociety's inter-
est ... would appear to turn on a number of variables." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall identified the central variable as the "likelihood that retrying the de-
fendant will lead to conviction." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). To determine this
probability, the dissent suggested that "one might inquire into whether prosecutors
tend in close cases to hold back probative evidence of a defendant's guilt; if they do not,
there would be scant societal interest in permitting retrial given that the State's remain-
ing evidence is, by definition, insufficient." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While recognizing that this central variable seems useful, Justice's Marshall's sug-
gested inquiry answers itself. It seems legitimate to question why a prosecutor would
ever hold back probative evidence of the defendant's guilt if he thought it was a close
case. In Lockhart, the prosecutor labored under the mistaken, though sincere belief that
Nelson's case was not close. As the majority observed in its opinion, "[T]here is no
indication that the prosecutor knew of the pardon and was attempting to deceive the
court." Id. at 288 n.2.
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that the majority arrived prematurely at a test for evaluating eviden-
tiary insufficiency for double jeopardy purposes, while disingenu-
ously treating it as a decision already reached.
77
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN LOCKHART
The Supreme Court has subjected the double jeopardy clause
of the Constitution to remarkably varying interpretations over the
past fifty years.78 The Court even conceded in BurkS79 that its
"holdings in this area ... can hardly be characterized as models of
consistency and clarity." 80 Indeed, the Court's Burks decision over-
ruled two established lines of decisions which allowed the state to
retry defendants who requested new trials as one avenue of relief.8 1
However, Burks hardly settled the issues involved. 2 Thus, the
Court's decision in Lockhart represented an opportunity to quell the
turbulence that marked the Court's recent decisions in this area.
Yet the Lockhart Court attempted to limit the significance of its
holding.8 3 This case hardly stands as a radical departure from the
principle established by Burks,84 or a clarification of double jeopardy
law. As the majority stated in the Lockhart opinion, the Burks deci-
sion specifically refers to the incorrect receipt of evidence as the sort
of trial error which carries no double jeopardy implications.8 5 Lock-
hart, however, raises the important question of how the Burks analy-
sis applies to erroneously admitted evidence which, when subtracted
from the state's case, leaves the state with insufficient evidence to
convict.8 6 As the majority contended, the Court's resolution of this
77 Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78 Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81,
82 (1979).
79 437 U.S. 1 (1979).
80 Id. at 9.
81 Id. at 10. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
82 The fact that Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun joined in a strongly
worded dissent to the majority holding in Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285, 292-96
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting), suggests that a certain degree of controversy still at-
taches to this issue. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
dissent in Lockhart.
83 The Court never placed Lockhart in its logical place within double jeopardy law-as
the functional and analytical counterweight to the Burks principle. Instead, the Court
stated, "Our holding today thus merely recreates the situation that would have been
obtained if the trial court had excluded the evidence of the conviction because of the
showing of a pardon." Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 291.
84 Burks, 437 U.S. at 18. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the principle established by Burks.




issue seems consonant with the logic of Burks.8 7 In this sense, the
Lockhart decision represents a positive move by the Court in the di-
rection of consistency. However, as the dissent points out, the ma-
jority's brief opinion missed an opportunity to clarify the thrust and
contours of the Court's post-Burks double jeopardy analysis.88 This
Note develops an analysis of the interests served by doublejeopardy
jurisprudence and explores how the Lockhart principle affects these
interests. Further, an examination of what lies behind these inter-
ests is provided to develop a better understanding of the Lockhart
principle's effect on double jeopardy jurisprudence.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY'S DECISION
As the Court expressed in Tateo, all double jeopardy decisions
entail a balancing of two corresponding interests: 1) the defend-
ant's interest in obtaining a fair trial, and 2) society's interest in pun-
ishing one whose guilt is clear.8 9 Embedded within the notion of a
fair trial is the concept of finality. Upon acquittal, the double jeop-
ardy clause absolutely protects the defendant's interest in finality by
barring retrial for the same offense. 90 Any result other than an ac-
quittal requires a double jeopardy analysis that balances the inter-
ests of the defendant and society. Thus, in cases like Lockhart, the
courts struggle to determine which contending interest overrides
the other.
Framed in this way, it seems clear that the Court's holding in
Lockhart amounts to a decision of which interest trumps the other in
situations like that present in Lockhart. Lockhart implies that, in the
case where incorrectly admitted evidence stands alone between suf-
ficient or insufficient evidence to convict, society's law enforcement
interest overrides the defendant's interest in finality.91
The Lockhart decision must be understood in the context of the
amount of protection afforded the defendant's interest by pre-Lock-
hart double jeopardy jurisprudence. Certain compelling considera-
87 Id. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
88 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 296 (MarshaIlJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the
majority opinion for its failure to detail such an analysis, stating that "[tihe Court today
should have enunciated ... rules calibrated to accomodate, as best as possible, the de-
fendant's interest in repose with society's interest in punishing the guilty." Id. (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
89 Id. Both the majority and dissenting opinions quote approvingly this passage from
the Tateo opinion. Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 289 and 295.
90 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1979).
91 It should be recognized that Burks represents a decision that the defendant's inter-
est in finality overrides society's interest in law enforcement where a reversal is based on
insufficient evidence. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 13, 15-17.
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tions92 explain the level of protection defendants enjoyed under
pre-Lockhart double jeopardy doctrine. Yet equally compelling ar-
guments exist for protecting legitimate state interests in double
jeopardy jurisprudence.93 A thorough discussion of these counter-
vailing interests entails an inspection of what lies behind them.
1. The Defendant's Interests
In order to analyze the impact of the Lockhart decision, one
must first look to how the double jeopardy clause protects the de-
fendant's interests. Primarily, the double jeopardy clause protects
the defendant's interest in finality.94 At the trial level this is accom-
plished by prohibiting any state appeal from a judgment of acquit-
tal.95 Thus, the double jeopardy clause affords the defendant's
interest in finality absolute protection in the case of acquittal.96 Var-
ious rationales exist for this rule of absolute protection enjoyed ex-
clusively by the defendant.97 Professors Westen and Drubel argue
convincingly that the most persuasive rationale for this rule lies in
the jury's "legitimate authority to acquit against the evidence." 98 If
one accepts the power to acquit against the evidence as within the
legitimate authority of the jury, then it follows that no acquittal may
92 See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
considerations.
93 See infra notes 106-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's
interests.
94 See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defendant's
interest in finality. The Court has found that the double jeopardy clause protects de-
fendants from certain forms of state oppression:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense, thereby [(1)] subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and [(2)]
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as [(3)]
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
95 Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.
96 Id.
97 Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 124-32. Professors Westen and Drubel identify
several plausible explanations for this absolute protection. First, this rule may be
designed to protect the defendant's legitimate expectations that a verdict of acquittal
will be final. Id. at 124. Second, this rule may simply recognize that the defendant pos-
sesses a greater interest in the finality of an acquittal than that of a conviction because it
acts in his favor. Id. at 127. Third, this rule may serve to prevent the state from perfect-
ing its case against the defendant. Id. at 129. Fourth, this rule may prohibit the state
from invading the exclusive fact-finding authority of the jury. Id. at 129. Finally, this
rule may protect the jury's authority to acquit against the evidence. Id.
98 Id. at 130-32. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 124-32 (defeat of the other
rationales discussed supra at note 97). Of course, the system will not permit juries to




be challenged as erroneous. 9 9
Yet this analysis only raises the question of why the judicial sys-
tem allows juries to acquit against the evidence. Perhaps the answer
to this question lies in the dissymmetry of resources between the
defendant and the state.1 0 0 The chief resource advantage that the
state possesses relative to the defendant would be the support of a
functioning bureaucracy. The criminal justice system, designed by
the state itself, is set into motion by the arrest of the defendant.
Clearly, the potential for harm to the individual defendant presents
itself, particularly where a part of this organized system works to
convict the defendant. This explains the presence at the trial level
of certain procedural safeguards such as the presumption of inno-
cence and the exclusionary rule.
Further, a recognition of this dissymmetry accounts for the de-
sign of the double jeopardy clause and its subsequent treatment by
the courts.10 ' The judicial system affords acquittals absolute final-
ity, as Professors Westen and Drubel argue, 0 2 in order to protect
the jury's authority to acquit against the evidence. Yet, this fails to
explain why juries should ever, either explicitly or implicitly, enjoy
such an authority. 0 3 An application of the dissymmetry model sug-
gests that the jury acts as the ultimate buffer between the defendant
and the considerable resources of the state. Thus, a decision to ac-
quit against the evidence might represent a judgment by the jury
that the state has used its resources unjustly against the defendant.
At the appellate level, this dissymmetry remains significant.
The Burks principle' 0 4 blunts the effect of this dissymmetry at the
appellate level. Burks requires that defendants receive immunity
99 Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 130. Professors Westen and Drubel argue that
"[t]here are no identifiably erroneous acquittals because every such purported candi-
date, evaluated by a legal standard resting on the evidence, may be explained alterna-
tively as an extralegal judgment by the jury to act against the evidence." Id.
100 The definition of resources as used here includes time, money, and administrative
capacity. This clarifies what the Green Court meant by its reference to "the State with all
its resources and power." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). While
the state may invest few resources into trying a particular defendant, double jeopardy
analysis seems to assume the state could invest a great amount of resources trying a
particular defendant if it so chose.
101 See supra note 94 for a discussion of the Court's view of the purpose of the double
jeopardy clause.
102 See supra notes 95-97 for a discussion of the absolute protection afforded the de-
fendant's finality interest.
103 Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 130 n.230. Professors Westen and Drubel
equate the jury's decision to acquit against the evidence with the chief executive's au-
thority to pardon or grant clemency, which is not subject to judicial review.




from re-prosecution if the state failed to muster sufficient evidence
at the trial.' 0 5 In light of the state's formidable resource advantage,
such a failure indicates an increased likelihood that the defendant is
actually innocent. Thus, a policy prohibiting retrial of defendants
under these circumstances reflects an appreciation of the resource
dissymmetry between the state and defendant.
Prior to Lockhart, individual defendants possessed significant
protection of their interests at the appellate level through applica-
tion of the Burks principle. This principle rests on a recognition of
the dissymmetry of resources between the state and the defendant.
Likewise, the procedural advantages that individual defendants pos-
sess at the trial level stem from a recognition of this disymmetry.
Therefore, the Burks principle merely preserves the defendant's trial
level advantage at the appellate level.
2. Society's Interest in Punishing the Guilty
The Lockhart principle guards society's interest in punishing the
guilty.' 0 6 By granting the state another opportunity to try the de-
fendant where the trial court erroneously admitted evidence,
10 7
Lockhart recognizes that the state likely used its resources in a judi-
cious manner. Unlike a reversal for insufficient evidence, a reversal
for trial error does not usually reflect a judgment that the state
squandered its resources. Under a resources analysis, this principle
also reflects the view that if the state judiciously employed its re-
sources it should not be prevented from reapplying them.
The Lockhart decision also saves certain costs to society. As
Professors Westen and Drubel observed, the cost of holding other-
wise poses the risk of putting many defendant's facing retrial under
the Ball principle' 08 beyond the reach of prosecution for crimes they
are guilty of committing.' 0 9 Nelson's situation in particular brings
the danger of an opposite rule into sharp relief. Both petitioner and
respondent in Lockhart agree that Nelson's record shows at least
three other felony convictions the prosecutor could have used at the
105 Id.
106 Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285, 289-90 (1988) (citing United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
107 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 291.
108 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ball principle.
109 See Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 147 n.292. The authors suggest that the
situation where a defendant suffers conviction on the basis of improperly admitted evi-
dence, yet can prove that without such evidence the evidence remains insufficient to
support a conviction, arises frequently. Id. Consequently, the costs to society of a prin-




sentence enhancement hearing."i 0 Thus, Nelson qualifies as a
clearly guilty defendant, at least for purposes of a sentence enhance-
ment proceeding.
The state retains two interests in prosecuting defendants: 1)
that of receiving one fair opportunity to convict one whose guilt it
strongly suspects,' 11 and 2) pursuing conviction without facing un-
reasonable expenses. A principle contrary to that in Lockhart raises
the prospect that the state might have to "overtry" cases. 112 Rul-
ings on the admissibility of evidence, like the one by the trial court
in Lockhart, induce reliance by the state. 113 The state suggests in its
brief that it "would be forced to 'throw in the kitchen sink' to avoid
reversal and dismissal because the state would never be entirely cer-
tain of how much of its case would be reviewed for sufficiency on
appeal."11 4 Such a rule affects the administration ofjustice because
it puts the state at great cost, at least in trying the case." 15
The state is also entitled to one fair opportunity to muster its
case. Situations like that in Lockhart, where because of no contem-
poraneous objection by counsel the court incorrectly receives cer-
tain evidence, promise to recur. In the absence of a correct ruling
by the trial court on the admissibility of a portion of state's evi-
dence, the state possesses an excuse for failing to muster sufficient
evidence to convict.'16 This excuse likely explains the Court's find-
ing in Lockhart that the incorrectly admitted evidence should be clas-
sified as "trial error" and not as a basis for reversal due to
insufficient evidence.' 17
V. CONCLUSION
By affording the state's law enforcement interest greater pro-
tection, the Lockhart decision serves as a functional and analytical
110 Petitioner's Brief at 16, Lockhart (No. 87-1277); Respondent's Brief at 5 n.1, Lock-
hart (No. 87-1277). See supra note 33 for a discussion of these other convictions.
11 The notion of one fair opportunity does not require that the procedural advan-
tages of the State and the defendant stand in equipoise. In reality, the defendant retains
a considerable advantage at the trial level. See supra note 100 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these advantages.
112 See Petitioner's Brief at 13, Lockhart (No. 87-1277).
113 Petitioner's Brief at 12, Lockhart (No. 87-1277).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 147 n.292 (the authors discern a possible
tendency of the courts to find society's law enforcement interest overriding where the
prosecution offers an excuse for its failure to muster evidence in the first trial).
117 Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290-91.
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counterweight to the Burks principle. 118 The Burks and Lockhart
principles guard, at the appellate level, the two identified interests
relevant to double jeopardy jurisprudence.' 19 While the Burks prin-
ciple protects the defendant's interest in finality, the Lockhart-princi-
ple supports the societal interest in punishing the guilty. Further,
the Lockhart and Burks principles together replicate, at the appellate
level, the balance of interests accomplished at the trial level.
The Lockhart court correctly recognized that the double jeop-
ardy clause adequately preserved the significant interests of the de-
fendant at both the trial and appellate levels. Yet society's law
enforcement interest deserves some protection, though not in a
measure equal to the defendant's. The Lockhart principle both pro-
tects this societal interest in law enforcement and replicates, at the
appellate level, the balancing of the interests present at the trial
level.
JOHN J. SIKORA JR.
118 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Burks
principle.
119 See supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two interests.
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